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Lee McKnight, Post Doctoral Fellow, Center for Technology, Policy and Industrial
Development, MIT, opened the session briefly introducing speakers and noting the
controversial and complex nature of the topic.
The first speaker was Robert Cohen, Economics Consultant, who has recently been working
on Japanese R&D activities related to HDTV. Cohen began by providing an overview of
what the Japanese have done to become leaders in HDTV as well as what they are doing
in relation to the coming generation of products based on HDTV research. Referring to
Exhibit 1, Cohen pointed out that the Japanese have spent roughly $ 1-1.5 billion dollars
over the past 25 years in the area. Most of the funds have come from the private sector,
but complemented by efforts in the NHK laboratories and more recently MITI's Visual
Control project.
Cohen explained that one of the reasons the Japanese have put so much effort into HDTV
is the large potential market, as estimated by the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications
(Exhibit 2). By the year 2,000 the annual sale will be about $ 20 billion for just HDTV
television, not including a number of related spinoffs (package software, HDTV theatre).
Referring to Exhibit 3, Cohen noted some of the current public programs. Over the next
5-7 years there will be about $ 2 billion put in these efforts. This compares with $ 500
million program for HDTV in Europe and a possible $ 30 million possible program in the
United States under DARPA.
Next, Cohen pointed out that as part of their HDTV effort the Japanese are developing the
infrastructure needed to take from what is now a satellite-based communication system to
a baseband network (Exhibit 4). Recently, NIT announced that its Information Network
System annual spending was rising to $ 10 billion a year. This is possibly 3-4 times what
is being spent in the United States and Europe. It will make quite a difference in terms
of an infrastructure for communications, computing and imaging.
Cohen went on, referring to Exhibit 5, to comment on some of the early applications of
HDTV technology in Japan. Most of these initiatives will be operational by 1990 and they
are usually financed by MITI or MPT. He also pointed out that the finance is quite
generous, particularly when a third sector corporation, a joint venture between a public and
a private company, is involved. For third sector corporations money is provided for the first
three years with no interest, and half of the prime in subsequent years. Moreover, now
there is much more hands on activity on the part of the financing institutions. For example,
they will help in providing the support infrastructure (e.g. software development) and
training.
Cohen observed that the Japanese strategy is to move from test types of HDTV on
traditional sets to more real and costly HDTV in industry, to do things like design. Even
American companies have started buying systems from the Japanese, e.g. Ford. HDTV can
also be very helpful in automated manufacturing for high-resolution visual control.
Cohen then commented on where the Japanese, based on a MITI-sponsored Delphi study,
think the HDTV technology effort is going to move in the next 20 years (Exhibit 6). They
are looking for 2,000 by 2,000 pixel screen development by the year 2,000. In relation to
Exhibit 6, Cohen also pointed out that future convergence of HDTV technology creates an
above average need for government financing and will increase its importance for defense
and communications purposes.
Cohen then noted that among the different ways the technology is being financed, the Key
Technology Center (JKTC) is a key institution. This center is financed from several
sources, including special funds from the Ministry of Finance (under Government Financial
Institutions) and dividends from Japan Tobacco. More recently, a special fund has been
set up for the JKTC. Finance includes low interest rate loans to small and medium
business as well as deferrement in pay back.
One of Cohen's concern is that response in the United States has been fairly limited. In
fact, the Bush Administration has cut back on its HDTV efforts and an HDTV focused
group may be dissolved. Why is it so? First, the Bush administration does not want to
have anything to do with something smacking of industrial policy. Second, it appears that
some people in the White House feel that there are some industries that the US should
give up. The problem is that the case has not been made economically that there are
certain critical links between not having a advanced semiconductor industry and not having
a competitive computer industry. There is no recognition of the synergy between
communications, computers and imaging and of the fact that these industries are now in a
very different ball game. People are under the delusion that we should not worry, someone
in a garage in Silicon Valley will come up with a new way of making semiconductors, a new
way for making supercomputers. That is wrong because you can not play this game unless
you have big bucks to put into the R&D. Possible consequences of not doing the R&D
have much greater implications in terms of losses of jobs and losses of investment. For
example, the US trade balance could be severely affected by the US failure to enter the
HDTV field in a major way.
Cohen concluded that the lesson to be drawn is that the ball game is being played in a very
different way, both here and in Europe. The Europeans have developed an HDTV system
and have done much more to get their electronics industries going, even cutting deals with
the Japanese. This is a reflection of our political inability to deal with strategic issues.
Without some sort of executive leadership we are going to be out of the race within 2-3
years.
The next speaker was Lester Thurow, Dean, Sloan School of Management, MIT. For
Thurow, we are facing a much more fundamental problem than just HDTV, a problem that
the US has not had to deal with for the past one hundred years: How do you catch up
technologically with someone who is ahead of you? Where, when and how do you make
an special effort to catch up? There is no mechanism in the market that assures you that
you will be able to catch up. Japan and West Germany have learned to catch up because
they have had to deal with it. Here economic development was tied very closely to military
power because if you did not have economic development you would have ceased to exist
as a country.
Thurow said that he wished to use HDTV as a symbol to answer the questions: what do we
do if we are behind and what do we do if we are out of an industry?
He added that the first issue to be addressed is where and when, because you can not play
catch up everywhere. There are a few things about which we need to have factual
knowledge. First, some people have argued that HDTV is a once in a lifetime opportunity
to break back into consumer electronics. It is a different enough technology that does not
give you the cost disadvantage as if you were for example trying to catch up in VCRs.
What makes consumer electronics so important is that it is the second largest market in the
world after automobiles. If the answer is yes, this is an opportunity to break back into a
very big industry, then the question is how because it is going to be expensive. Two
examples. First, twenty years ago the Europeans decided that it would be unacceptable to
be left out of the civilian aircraft industry. They first failed with Concorde. But they made
it with the second attempt, the Airbus. It took 18 years and $ 15 billion. The lesson is that
it is not a cheap enterprise and that no private company would ever put up that kind of
money or wait that much time. It took the governments of Europe to work as a group, five
of them.
As second example, take the Japanese strategy for breaking back into the computer market.
It was a very expensive and time consuming strategy that involved holding IBM's market
position in place, giving all kinds of special privileges such as the Japanese Computer
Leasing Company only to Japanese companies. But it took them 15 years and a large
amount of money to get a competitive computer industry.
You have to think about systems of organizations and amounts of money when you break
into a big industry like consumer electronics that are very different. And the technical
question on HDTV is, is this the strategic moment to do it ?
The second argument is, is this a technology that if you do not have it you are going to lose
a lot of other industries? Some people argue that HDTV is that kind of technology. For
example, if you control the HDTV technical standards you can write it in such a way that
no American computer will work with that HDTV. In this way you can point people in
the direction of your own computer industry. IBM did that with software. The argument
is that HDTV will allow you to do things with computers that will obviate the American
advantage in software. Or this is a technology that will have a profound impact on areas
that Americans still control, industrial electronics and military electronics. Or this
technology will be attached to machine tools, and if you do not have the technology you will
not have a competitive machine tool industry. Ultimately the question one has to ask is this
a technology that the other guy can use against you in a very predatory way?
The third argument, Thurow continued, is whether this is a technology where there is an
opportunity to create brand new industries that up until this day have not existed? Some
people think that HDTV is such a technology. For example, HDTV could be used for
increasing competitiveness in clothes retail.
Thurow said that if you think that anyone of these three arguments is valid, then you have
a problem in playing catch up. The problem is that the benefits of succeeding are very
widely diffused across a set of industries and a set of firms. None of these have the money,
or the interest or the capability to anteing up the big backs to get back in.
In consumer electronics the last American firm is Zenith, whose total sales are less than
Matsushita's research budget.
Then the question is how to put together a system that does it? In Japan the system
involves MITI and in Germany the systems tends to involve institutions like the Deutsche
Bank, which has controlling interests in the top 400 German firms. In the United States
we do not have the institutions.
Thurow asserted that microelectronics and Steve Jobs in a garage was a mirage. That
happens once in a 1,000 years. All new industries require a lot of money, not a job for
venture capitalists. Another question is can one buy this technology on the market on an
equal access basis? That's the argument that you should let the Japanese spend all the
money on research and then we can buy the HDTV sets and plug into our other equipment.
The first issue here is: will they design standards that you know well enough in advance so
that you can in fact plug your equipment into them? The second issue is: can you in fact
do that? The reason IBM got interested in an industrial policy for semiconductor
equipment manufacturers, is that IBM did not get equal access along with Japanese
manufacturers to an advance supply of Nikon's new mask making equipment. Moreover
in the US we have a set of complicated firms in terms of how do they relate with their
home country, such as Sony and Honda, which have a higher implantation in the US than
in Japan. Can one trust Sony to make HDTV sets for the American industry?
Thurow concluded that what worries him most is that people in Washington have not taken
his three questions seriously at all. What we have is an ideological debate of should or
should not the government intervene held in a very abstract world.
According to Thurow it boils down to a very simple problem: We Americans like to lie to
ourselves about many issues, including that we are very pragmatic people. Nonsense. We
are the original religious crusaders, and having a religious crusade is much more important
than having a successful consumer electronics industry.
Thurow concluded that the key thing here, going back to where he started, is how do you
play catch up and get back in. He also reminded the audience that the market mechanism
nowhere says that America will catch up. Thus to play catch up here require changes in
our industrial structure, changes in our institutions, and to do things in new ways. The
evidence does not show that Americans have any interest in changing.
The next speaker was Lee McKnight, postdoctoral fellow, Center for Technology and
Industrial Policy, MIT.
McKnight began showing how each century has had its major wave of innovation, arguing
that in the 21st century telecommunications and telematics are likely to play a key role in
the economy of the future.
Referring to Exhibit 7, McKnight said that in Europe specific programs are trying to
organize to make Europe competitive in these areas: RACE, ESPRIT, JESSI and
EUREKA. He went on to focus his remarks on EUREKA, an industry-led program in
which the European HDTV standard has been developed. McKnight explained that
EUREKA works as a double network for a networked economy, which sponsors joint
research among private firms, public research laboratories and universities. EUREKA's
focus is on pre-competitive research, but spills over beyond it into manufacturing as well.
Eureka was established 4 years ago and has already launched some 280 projects with
investment totaling about $ 6-8 billion, involving both small and large firms. Referring to
Exhibit 8, McKnight pointed out that there are almost 20 countries involved and its
programs range from automotive safety to HDTV. Eureka effectively provides an
introduction service to team up countries or firms and also acts as a marketing tool, for
once a project gets the Eureka stamp it gets widely publicized. He also pointed out that
the project cycle is quite fast, with action being taken in about 45 days after submission of
a project proposal.
McKnight then turned to discuss standards and HDTV. He noted that standard setting is
a dynamic process which involves a multiplicity of organizations. Traditionally a firm would
develop a proprietary technology, which would then be passed on to a public or private
standard setting body, and possibly, if successful to international harmonization or
standardization. However, the world moves more rapidly these days and in addition to the
traditional standard setting bodies new mechanisms have evolved such as the corporate
consensus standards body (e.g., the Open Software Foundation). The X-Windows, the
UNIX standard and the HDTV European standard can also be considered as standards
created through a group of firms (and possibly universities and government agencies)
coming together and agreeing that this would be a common basis for further R&D and new
product development. At the same time all this feeds into the for example open system
trend: Open Systems Interconnection and ISDN standards. Referring to Exhibits 9 and 10,
McKnight pointed out that in Europe the technology has progressed from PAL and
SECAM, the current television standards on through research on a number of multiplex
analogue component standards for satellite broadcasting. From the mid-1980s the Japanese
really picked up the pace promoting their 1125/60 HDTV standard for global
standardization by the CCIR.
Referring to Exhibit 9 McKnight remarked that the Eureka project started first as a
reaction to feared technological advantage the U.S. might gain through the Star Wars
program. Within two years Philips, Thomson and Bosch and at the time Thorn-EMI,
working together developed prototype 1250/50 HDTV equipment. The standard is now
before the CCIR. In the US, as usual, there has not been a coordinated program, there are
multiple competing standard proposals under consideration by the FCC and others,
including the Japanese 1125/60 standard. There is rapid technological progress but at the
moment no coordination mechanism for reaching consensus. There was powerful
momentum behind the Sony/NHK 1125 line system, but concerns were raised that
acceptance of these standards would create potentially unsurmountable barriers to
American firms in many industries. A number of proposals are coming out of MIT that
might help solve the current standards stalemate at an international level. Referring to
Exhibit 11, McKnight suggested that one possible way out may be through flexible, open,
digital smart receivers. The concept of Open Architecture Receivers was developed by
__
Bill Schereiber and Andy Lippman at MIT. Such an open system approach is already
common in other areas such as computers. Yet the complexity of international standard
setting is enormous. As shown in Exhibit 12, the number and geographical diversity of
organizations involved and their mandate is quite large, including just in the US the State
Department at an international level and the FCC at the domestic level.
McKnight concluded that if standards can be used to control and create new industries this
suggests that the U.S. has to rethink the way it sets standards, how quickly it does so and
how it coordinates that with other industrial or research initiatives. McKnight proposed an
Eureka-like structure supported by private industry to facilitate R&D and technology
support mechanisms, a potential Corporation for Advanced Technology. The proposal as
it stands does not require government leadership. Conceptually one could imagine a small
office like Eureka to facilitate risk sharing and information sharing in a range of
technologies, including HDTV. The proposal does not address where will the money come
from. In fact, the revenues needed for the program are not so great, as in the case of
Eureka where the stamp of approval is the largest benefit. The greatest advantage of this
proposal is that it would just create a small office to take the lead to help industry
coordinate its efforts.
The first question in the ensuing question and answer period asked where is the need for
cooperation most pressing, in R&D or deployment? Thurow answer was that there is a
striking difference between the way America, the Japanese and Germany spend their R&D
money. The US spends 70 percent on new products and 30 percent on new processes; the
Japanese just the opposite; and the Germans come down in the middle. The US used to
spend correctly but things have changed in the last 20 years, so inventing a new product doe
not necessarily do you any good. You have to manufacture. All the major new consumer
electronics products were not invented by the Japanese. Thus the old distinction between
process and product investment does not hold any more and that is part of the problem
with HDTV. The problem is not to be able to invent it but make it cheaper. The US
government only does serious research in health. Research is not something firms will do
without the right incentives. With the end of the cold war the US has to move away from
military research and needs new institutions. We cannot continue to rely on DARPA and
DOD alone.
Cohen replied that there have been U.S. industrial policy efforts to deal with industries
when we knew it was going to take a lot of investment. Part of the problem is that the
economics profession dropped any discussion of how we really dealt with industrial
development, especially with government playing a central role. The development of RCA
is a good case as well as MIT's development of automated machinery with the sponsorship
of the Air Force. The US has set up many of the institutional models which were then
copied by the Japanese. He argued that it is necessary to get things to market at the right
price. Thurow added that the major catch up effort in the post war period was the space
program.
The next question asked which area should the US target, if we consider that the area of
communications and consumer electronics is already lost. Thurow replied that in the world
______
economy you play a cooperative and competitive game simultaneously. There is a whole
set of cooperative things that the US still has to do with the Europeans and the Japanese.
But at the same time one wishes the US to generate a world class standard of living. There
is certainly some industries that the US will be behind in, but given the size of its
population the US cannot afford to be behind in very much and still generate a world class
standard of living. He added that it is his belief that electronics is too big for the US to
lose and he also does not see any other sector out there big enough to replace it.
The following comment questioned how will the US do the catch up, in particular if the US
goes towards a government-led strategy how to avoid excessive bureaucratization and
conversely if the US goes towards an industry-led strategy how to avoid penetration by
foreign industry in an open economy. Thurow's answer was that the public and private
distinction is a false one, in other countries the distinction is not so clear. He suggested
that in the US the direction to take is to create an industry-led industrial policy which
government supports rather than the other way around. That is why there is a need to
change the US banking legislation to allow the creation of combines like the Deutsche
Bank.
Cohen added part of the answer to the catch up strategy is that from where Japanese
started that they were clearly focusing on where higher value added was going to be
created. The question is not to decide which industries to drop but what sort of
opportunities you lose down the road. The Japanese have systematically identified where
are the real high value opportunities and how do you need to restructure the Japanese
economy to provide the capital investment and educational changes to get there. Thus the
issue is how will the US be able to assure that individual firms will organize for identifying
these high value added opportunities.
Thurow added that what is efficient for an individual firm has to do with how the
government organizes the incentives for the area. For example the US is falling behind in
electronic banking whereas in France the government has taken the responsibility to
establish the necessary network to speed up the diffusion of electronic banking. In the US
you cannot do that because it requires a degree of organization which is lacking in the
system.
McKnight commented that a Corporation for Advanced Technology could do much of the
facilitation and coordination effort. A second element of the catch up strategy should be
a pilot project similar to Japan's Hi Vision community program. The Japanese program
aims to provide experience and feedback to Japanese industry. If the US goes in the
direction of the open architecture receiver, it is not likely to succeed without large pilot
projects involving many cities and providing mechanisms for the various concerned
industries, producers and users, to collaborate.
Cohen remarked that the US already has a number of national institutions analogous to the
Deutsche Bank, in educational loans, in housing, in agriculture. Why not use this national
mechanism? The semiconductor commission is proposing such mechanisms, in the
American way. Thurow commented that most of the financial mechanisms mentioned are
in deep financial trouble. Cohen replied that the model can be used and well managed.
_ ___I__
The next question asked for comments on proprietary systems and on the emergence of
three economic blocs in the future as regards HDTV future development.
McKnight answered that open does not mean non-proprietary. You can have an open
system and open standard to which someone may have ownership rights. MS-DOS is a case
in point. The standard setting process and open architecture development is complex and
in HDTV the main efforts have been to block the Japanese standard. It is not clear at this
point who owns the patent rights over the modified version of the Japanese standard which
allows for compression for broadcasting and cable transmission.
Cohen added that up until now it was assumed that you could set up your own standard to
protect your industry. But now with the move towards deregulation and global
communications it is much more difficult to control these areas. Now the Japanese have
an HDTV-type monitor with a production cost less than $ 1,000 and within a couple of
years they could easily put together a combined HDTV plus HDTV/VCR. And there is
nothing to stop a cable company to sign an agreement with Japanese companies to send
special movies to these sets. The possibility for commercializing HDTV in a different way
means the formal standards bodies may have nothing to do with commercial success.
The next comment built upon Cohen's remark about the importance of software and stated
that the US may have a natural lead and aptitude for software development, the things that
will run on HDTV. Does control of the HDTV hardware really control that activity or
should the US put its energy into information products.
McKnight's reply was that Sony's strategy is an integrated hardware and software strategy,
to avoid the early problems they had with the lack of software availability on Betamax. It
shows that you can still use standards as a key lever to your success in hardware.
Thurow added that it depends on the hardware producer strategy. Apple could have
blocked people from writing software for its computers. The software guy is at the mercy
of the hardware guy. It is also mistaken to think that the Us has some natural innate
comparative advantage in software. In fact, our competitors have a strategy to wrestle this
industry from the U.S. as they had a strategy with Airbus. For example, the new European
television protocols explicitly say that sixty percent of the programming has to come from
Europe. This is the beginning of a strategy for pushing down the monopoly of the US in
the entertainment industry.
Cohen disagreed by saying that there are advantages for the US software industry given the
visual nature of the culture and larger experience with computers. The problem is that we
know very little about the economics of these knowledge-based industries and how do you
maintain advantage. The commercial market for software has been barely tapped. Some
people like George Gilder who would argue that is where to go. The problem is that he
is assuming that the infrastructure is going to be there. This is certainly an area in which
the U.S. has an advantage.
The next question asked if once a standard emerges and you enter a more commodity-type
______ ____
market or a special market develops is there any strategy for a player that starts behind
either for jumping on the commodity curve or providing special products.
Cohen answer was that there is a clear use for HDTV in hospitals, schools and in the
defense system as a strategy. Current government expenses can be used to drive the early
part of the industry. There could also be financial help for the auto industry to start
adopting HDTV. The US has technology in these areas that certainly outclasses the
Japanese. Some of the US-made flat panel displays are far ahead than anything coming
from Japanese leaders. Similarly the US digital processing and compression technologies
are still quite advanced.
The next question about world competition was addressed to Thurow. Are we really
dealing with business as usual? Can the US really meet their sources of power given by
what appears to be a total vacuum of power of the US in these matters? Will the US be
able to develop a countervailing organizational power to the Japanese and German
challenges.
Thurow answer was that there is no evidence that the Japanese cheat, but rather that they
play the game very shrewdly. The US has to do the same. The problem is that the US
protects the dying industries while the Japanese protect the leading industries. The game
is different for the US because there was this postwar period which was an anomaly in
which the US was ahead in everything. The way to go in HDTV is to have demonstration
projects and use creativity, because we have no industry except Zenith.
Cohen commented in relation to the Japanese different way of operation that given US
anti-trust regulations it is not likely that IBM could
do things that Fujitsu does in bidding in Japan. The US has to understand that the
Japanese think different and interpret rules differently.
The last question asked what would be the forum to discuss a national HDTV strategy in
practical terms and who would be the players. Thurow argued that there is a need for a
strong Executive leadership, it is not something that can be done alone by Congress. The
problem is that the Bush administration is coming down to say that the US has no problem
and there is no such a thing as designing an American solution. Cohen then added that the
solution is to get the President to see the problem.
_ ____ _ __ ____·____·__
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JAPANESE PROGRAMS FOR HDTV:
TOTAL SPENDING
(in millions of dollars)
Sponsor Years for Cmpanies Total Budget
Program Involved (Yen Billions) ($Millions
Giant Electronics
Project Key Tech 1988-94 15 13 $88.3
High Vision City Program MPT 1989-92 14 cities 14.4 $96
High Vision Communities MITI 1989-92 10-20 cities ($50+)
Hi-Vision Promotion
Center MITI 1988-92(?) 2.7 18
Flat Panel Displays Key Tech 1988-1994 12 30 $200
Rear Projection Key Tech 1988- 3 3.9 26
Broadcasting Satellite-3 NHK-linked FY 1985&86 3.6 24
High Definition Television
Engineering Corporation Key Tech 1989-1993 4 3.9 $26
HDITV Satellites - NHK-linked 1989-1991 84 $560
HDIV Satellite
Corporation NHK-linked 1991-1997 107.25 $715
Hi-Vision Comm-nications MITI 1989- 69
Regional Hi-Vision System
Communications MPT 1989- 31
Nihon Hi-Vision:
Lease Hi-Vision Software MPT 1989- 40
High-Level Image Technology
Research Laboratories Key Tech 1989-1992 3 12 75
Graphics Communications
Technologies, Ltd. 1989-1992 4.5 30
TOTAL HDIV FUNDING IN JAPAN :1985-1997: 279.25 Billion Yen or $1.9 Billion
EXHIBIT 3
JAPANESE COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTING
INITIATIVES RELATED TO HDTV:
ANNUAL SPENDING













Total spending $ 20.12 Billion
EXHIBIT 4
~
EXAMPLES OF THE USES OF HIGH VISION TECHNOLOGY
CONSIDERED FOR INCLUSION IN THE HIGH VISION CITIES PROGRAM
Type of HDIV Years Available Expected Cost



















































































Y 250 million to
Y 500 million
Y 80 million to
Y 240 million
Y 80 million to
Y 240 million
Y 30 million to
Y 70 million
Y 40 million to
Y 100 million
Y 13 million to
Y 220 million
Y 13 million to
Y 220 million
Y 3 million to
Y 20 million
Y 3 million to
Y 20 million
Y 80 million to
Y 140 million
EXHIBIT 5~-~---- -- -
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Practical Use of Oolcr Inmge PaFrls
with a Resoluticn of the Order of 1000
by 1000 Pix)ls fcr Use in lRrtable TVs
Practical Use of Displays that Can
be Read likM Print cn Paper
Practical Use of olor Video Display
Panels with a 1esoluticn of at Least
2000 by 2000 Pixels
Widespread Use of Flat Cblar IV
Screen Size of at Least 20 Irdmes
Develmpent of Ire-Diensial TV that
Can be VieJed Witcut Special (Glase
Develpentt of Tecnolgy to Dstinguih
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Speed ard an a Par With amars
Widespread Use of C°n uicatics Systems
for Retrieval of Still or ~btic Video
Infcaratin frm Electronic Libraries
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Research on Advanced Communications for Europe
Broadband communication technologies.
ESPRIT
European Strategic Program for Research
on Information Technologies
Digital signal processing, etc.
EUREKA
Advanced Technology
(non-industry-specific, but including Eureka-95,
the Philips/Thomson/Bosch 1250/50 standards alliance)
EXHIBIT 7
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1125/60 & 1250/50 'COMPATIBILITY'
THROUGH OPEN VIDEO ARCHITECTURE
OPEN VIDEO ARCHITECTURE SMART RECEIVERS
1125/60 1250/50
EXHIBIT II
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